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March 17, 1989

Joseph A. Jetikics
Mas u-

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq.
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Robert Bennett, et. al. v. Bow Valley
Development Corp., aka Flying Diamond
Development Corp., a political
subdivision of the State of Utah,
and Stephen G. Stewart, an individual
(Case No. 870118)

Dear Mr. Butler:
The above cited case has been fully briefed and
submitted to the Utah Supreme Court for decision.
However, subsequent to this case being submitted for
decision, four relevant cases have been decided by the
Utah Supreme Court which are relevant to the issues of
this case. Pursuant to Rule 24 (j), Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, respondent Provo City Corporation cites
these four cases for consideration by the Court.
In Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 740 P.2d
1337 (Utah, 1987), the plaintiff had alleged a negligence
cause of action. The Court states that merely "phrasing
the claim as one for negligence does not bring it within
the category of claims for which immunity is waived" (at
1340). It then went on to re-characterize the claim as
one for battery and false imprisonment and stated that
for these actions immunity was not waived.
(See Point
III.A., pages 25-30, Respondent's Brief).
Appellant
argues that claims in equity are not barred by the
Governmental Immunity Act. The Maddocks case makes it
clear that just because the plaintiff says it is a claim
in equity does not make it so.
City Attorney's
Office

351 West Center Street
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, I tuh 84003
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In the case of Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah, 2988), the Court discusses
which of the many decisions by city and state officials
should be analyzed by the Court to determine if
discretionary immunity existed.
Gleave, citing prior
case law (beginning at 668) sets forth a logical test and
finds immunity for a state employee's decision concerning
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which sign should be installed at a railroad crossing.
In Loveland v. City of Orem, 746 P.2d 763 (Utah, 1987),
the Court finds a variety of relevant activities immune
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The Court
finds that (1) the monitoring by city employees of the
construction and development of property, (2) the
Planning Commission's recommendation (or lack thereof)
of particular provisions in regard to development, and
(3) the failure of the city engineer or other city
employees charged with supervising and monitoring
construction of a subdivision to insure that the
improvements were installed as required, are all immune
under the Act. (See Point II, pages 15-24, Respondent's
Brief). In this case, city officials made similar types
of decisions.
Finally, in Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13
(December 12, 1988), the Court held that for causes of
action that arose before the Governmental Immunity Act
Amendments of 1983, the notice requirements of that Act
do not apply when a government employee is sued in an
"individual11 rather than "public" capacity.
In
distinguishing when an employee of a governmental entity
is being sued in an individual or public capacity, the
Court says that causes of action based on fraudulent or
malicious conduct are claims in an individual capacity
for which, in 1980, governments had neither the
obligation to indemnify nor defend the employee. (See
Point III.D., pages 37-39; and Point IV, pages 39-42,
Respondent's Brief).
Thank you for your attention to these cases.
Sincerely,

David C. Dixon
Robert D. West
Provo City
Attorney's Office
Attorneys for Respondent
DCD/bb
cc. Craig Anderson

